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ABSTRACT
State–society relations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have been deeply impacted 
by the dynamics around collective identities in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings and of other 
domestic and regional far-reaching developments, such as the failed coup attempt in Turkey or 
the ramifications of the Syrian conflict. It is therefore of utmost importance to discuss the changes 
(or lack thereof) in the articulation of collective identities, what pressures shape them, and what 
impact this has on the societal actors and ultimately on their relations with the state institutions 
and policies. In this regard two trends can be identified whereby pluralization and hybridization 
in certain countries, for example Morocco and Tunisia, stand in opposition to entrenchment 
and polarization, as illustrated by the Israeli and the Turkish cases. The result is heightened 
conflictuality in state–society relations and within societies at large in the MENA with the risk of 
spillovers at the regional level.
INTRODUCTION
State–society relations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are in a state of flux. Not only 
did disruptions in the domestic orders based on the old social contracts – often compounding the 
impact of regional dynamics – lead to the outbreak of the popular protests and social unrest that 
convulsed the MENA in 2011, but state–society relations have also been the object of a constant, 
more or less visible process of contestation and reshaping in the countries that were not affected 
by the Arab uprisings. Understanding the processes of reconfiguration of the domestic orders in 
the MENA thus needs to start from an appraisal of the trends that drive state–society relations 
and that are likely to impact on the different players’ regional stances and ultimately the MENA 
regional order as a whole. Arguably, domestic dynamics tend to influence regional developments 
in a way that calls for a more fine-grained description and assessment of the politics of domestic 
order-making.
1 Silvia Colombo is Senior Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Enrico Campelli is a PhD student in Public, 
Comparative and International law, curriculum in State Theory and Comparative Political Institutions, at the Department 
of Political Science of Sapienza University of Rome. Francesca Caruso is Junior Researcher at IAI. Raffaella A. Del Sarto 
is Associate Professor of Middle East Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS 
Europe), and Part-time Professor at the Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute (EUI). Research for this 
report has been carried out by Enrico Campelli and Raffaella A. Del Sarto (EUI) for the Israeli case study, Francesca 
Caruso (IAI) on Morocco, Silvia Colombo (IAI) on Tunisia and the Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM) 
for the case study on Turkey.
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State–society relations as an object of research do not exist in a vacuum. They are embedded in the 
broader political–institutional environment that represents the skeleton of the state and shapes 
its relations to society. Political and institutional factors such as party politics, the content of the 
constitution and the powers of specific institutions can be regarded as facilitating or constraining 
variables in state–society relations. They provide the order-making incentives (or lack thereof) 
to structure relations both vertically (between the state and society) and horizontally (between 
the different components of society). State institutions in particular can be defined as a set of 
“routines, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies, organizational forms, and technologies 
around which political activity is constructed” (March and Olsen 1989: 22). They are the essence 
of politics as they regulate the allocation of power resources, shape the goals political actors 
pursue and influence their strategies, and constrain or allow certain political actions by raising 
or reducing their costs and by setting the parameters for policy-making (Hall 1986). This top-
down function of institutions vis-à-vis state–society relations needs to be matched with other 
bottom-up factors stressing the relational character of the interplay between states and societies. 
MENA societies are not monolithic and are permeated by tensions and changes that – often not so 
visible, and difficult to measure – stand at the core of the revolutionary transformations that have 
been affecting some countries in the region since 2011. In all respects, institutions and political 
behaviours are hard to change, but when this happens it is often the result of significant triggering 
factors such as revolutions or coups and it leads to very visible watersheds in the articulation 
of power at multiple levels. On the other hand, societal changes are constantly occurring but 
often remain hidden behind the continuation of long-standing and deep-seated behaviours and 
ingrained meanings. Nevertheless, societies have a tendency to reinvent themselves, to articulate 
new identities, needs and claims, and to refashion their relations with state institutions and actors 
in sometimes powerful ways.
The comparative politics literature discussing the breakdown of authoritarian regimes and the 
construction of new polities throughout the MENA region makes a distinction between the “political 
society” and the “civil society” (Bellin 2011, Stepan 2012). The former is made up of parties, 
parliaments, elections and constitutions, namely the institutions and political actors and processes 
that represent the structure of the state. The latter is an example of the “quiet encroachment of 
the ordinary”, to borrow Asef Bayat’s expression, namely the expression of “politics” taking place 
outside the confined spaces of political parties and institutions (Bayat 2013). At the most visible 
level, it was represented by the thousands of people who spontaneously took to the streets and 
squares at the beginning of 2011, one of the signs of re-politicization in the MENA. In general 
terms, however, it can be read as the visible manifestation of the societal stances finding channels 
of free expression. This is the result of often invisible processes of change in the composition, 
identity articulation and claims of the societal actors, leading to more or less visible changes in 
their postures vis-à-vis the state as well as its agencies. In this light, the dynamics this report will 
dwell upon concern the reframing of collective identities throughout the MENA region and their 
impact on state–society relations. Collective identities stand at the core of societal dynamics and 
determine groups’ needs, interests and stances towards the other societal actors and the state. 
As such, they often represent the link between societies and state institutions’ policies that are 
framed around identity issues. It is therefore of utmost importance to discuss the changes (or lack 
thereof) in the articulation of collective identities in the MENA countries, what pressures shape 
them, and what impact this has on the societal actors and ultimately on their relations with the 
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state institutions and policies. The empirical analysis drawn from the MENA shows that important 
but often little researched changes have taken place on these fronts. This applies both to the 
countries that have experienced deep transformations in the framework of the Arab uprisings and 
to those that have not but have nonetheless been affected by changes in their societal make-up as 
a result of internal and external pressures.
To shed light on these dynamics and their implications for state–society relations in the MENA, 
this report is structured in three parts. The first part frames the role of collective identities as 
drivers of domestic order-making in the MENA. It also briefly presents the case studies (Israel, 
Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey)2 and some background information about state–society relations in 
each of them. The second part discusses the main trends within collective identity dynamics in the 
MENA on the basis of the empirical evidence gathered during the fieldwork missions conducted 
in the four countries between December 2017 and March 2018. Finally, the third part assesses the 
impact of such dynamics on domestic order-making by extrapolating three general trends. These 
trends can be tentatively generalized to other cases in the MENA region although they are not 
meant to be exhaustive or statistically representative. This allows to shed light on state–society 
relations in the MENA in general and on the need to adopt different interpretative lenses and policy 
responses.
1. FRAMING THE ROLE OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 
IN THE MENA
Assessing state–society relations in the MENA through the lens of collective identities means 
dwelling on the role of specific identity markers in shaping the way in which one group, as opposed 
to individuals, identifies and differentiates itself from the rest of society on the basis of – but 
not exclusively on – religion, ethnicity, tribe/clan/family affiliations, gender or age. Not only do 
collective identities provide order to societies, they are embedded in and produce deeply political 
acts. Important studies related to the MENA have argued that identity and politics are mutually 
formed and exist in a dialectic relationship (Wilson 1982, Khoury and Kostiner 1991). Seeing 
collective identities as social constructs and as political – and not pre-political – acts makes it 
possible to shed light on two dynamics in which identities and politics interact (Makdisi 2000, 
Telhamy and Barnett 2002). On the one hand, having a certain communal or group feeling shapes 
how people see themselves and others as well as creates a particular framework for exercising 
power vis-à-vis other societal groups or the state. On the other hand, identities are the terrain 
upon which states construct institutions and enact specific policies. Identity categories in the 
MENA have thus traditionally been used or manipulated through repression or co-optation by 
state or non-state actors as a way to justify a particular domestic order.
2 These cases have been selected so as to be able to conduct our empirical analysis across a very diverse range of 
countries in terms of political system, history, societal composition, regional power status and salience of the Arab 
uprisings. In other words, the richness of our sample provides even greater value to the insights developed in this report 
as they are drawn from a very heterogeneous set of countries.
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While forms of collective identification have always existed as a result of common traits and shared 
experiences and claims, these are not fixed. Collective identities are constantly reshaped by 
external contingencies and individual cost–benefit analyses with regard to specific groups’ claims 
and stances vis-à-vis state policies and institutions. This mostly takes place in a gradual, invisible 
way with some degree of path-dependence ingrained in such processes (Thelen 2003). However, 
there are specific circumstances that trigger sudden, visible changes in the way in which one or 
more groups of people perceive their identity and act upon it to fulfil old or new goals. These critical 
junctures often coincide with changes in state–society relations to which the reconfiguration of 
collective identities ultimately contributes. State–society relations can be disrupted by external 
or domestic shocks such as revolutions, (socio-economic) crises and conflicts, leading to a more 
or less pronounced, top-down or bottom-up restructuring of state institutions. The Arab uprisings 
that started in 2011 in Tunisia arguably represented one such turning point, prompting important 
transformations in the institutional set-up and in the domestic orders more broadly, not only 
in the countries that were directly affected by the wave of unrest but in the MENA region as a 
whole (Colombo 2018). The (temporary) opening up of spaces for free expression and dissent has 
impacted forcefully on collective identities in some MENA countries and on their relationship to 
state institutions and policies, catalyzing processes of change that in some cases had already been 
ongoing as well as others that emerged for the first time.
The research hypothesis tested in this report is that the process of reconfiguration of state–society 
relations in the MENA has been significantly shaped – in some cases more than in others – by 
new trends in identity politics and in particular by changes at the level of collective identities. This 
dynamic concerns in particular those countries in which collective identities based on religious 
and ethnic, but also ideological and political, self-identification have emerged forcefully as drivers 
for contestation and political action during or after the Arab uprisings, although it does not exclude 
other cases as well, albeit with some nuances. Changes in collective identities have taken different 
forms, including the pluralization or hybridization of sectarian, tribal or ethnic markers of identity 
that have become plural in their expressions and claims. Opposite trends pointing in the direction 
of the entrenchment of existing collective identities or the subsuming of different collective 
identities under a larger one have also appeared in specific cases across the MENA region, leading 
in some instances to heightened polarization. The academic as well as policy-related interest 
around collective identities does not exclusively lie in the study of their changes and continuities, 
but first and foremost in the assessment of the impact of these dynamics at the political and 
institutional levels. Firstly, it means asking questions related to the nature, conditions, intensity 
and direction of the different trends in identity politics. Secondly, it means dwelling on the extent 
to which changes in collective identities (or lack thereof) have been embedded into institutions 
and political processes. As will be discussed in the last section of this report, the rewriting of the 
constitutions in Tunisia and Morocco provided important spaces to discuss and negotiate the role 
of collective identities within the new state architectures between 2011 and 2014. In other contexts, 
such as in Egypt, there has been no successful institutional accommodation of alternative claims 
based on such changing collective identities.
As discussed in the background paper of Work Package 4, studying collective identities, their 
changes (or lack thereof) and their impact at the institutional and political levels means asking 
two interrelated sets of questions. Firstly, to what extent can we observe a dichotomy between 
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pluralization and hybridization, on the one hand, and entrenchment and polarization of collective 
identities, on the other, in the MENA? Is it possible to speak of a pluralization of collective 
identities, meaning the process through which collective identities defining people’s sense of 
belonging have increased in number without necessarily becoming more pluralistic over time 
(Boserup and Colombo 2017)? Is this the result of the “explosion” of pre-existing collective 
identities along competing and/or conflictual fault lines, or is this dynamic linked to the “bubbling 
up” of previously dormant collective identities? Have some collective identities, on the contrary, 
become more entrenched and polarized to the detriment of others? Secondly, what is the impact 
of collective identities on the restructuring or maintenance of the domestic political order? How 
do collective identities manifest themselves at the level of organized groups, their composition, 
interests and claims? In addition, how are these interests and claims taken into account by state 
policies and institutions? What domestic order emerges from this dynamic in terms of cooperation 
versus conflict in state–society relations? These sets of questions are thoroughly scrutinized in 
the following pages of this report on the basis of the data drawn from some forty-five in-depth 
interviews carried out in Israel, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey with interviewees belonging to the 
categories of state officials, members of political parties, experts and academics, journalists and 
activists (the full list of interviews is provided in the Annex). These four case studies have been 
selected as they present rich, even contrasting evidence with regard to the research hypothesis on 
the changing role of collective identities in the MENA, which can be summarized by the dichotomy 
“pluralization/hybridization vs entrenchment/polarization”. This is very healthy and confirms that 
discussing this dynamic in its different forms is relevant for shedding light on similarities and 
differences across the region. Major differences in this regard have to do with the legacy of previous 
state–society relations and the place of collective identities within them, to issues pertaining to 
the domestic institutional and political architecture, to regional and external drivers and to the 
different salience of 2011 as a turning point compared with other watersheds, for example the 
failed coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016. To capture these differences, it is important to start with 
a short description of the situation in each of the four case studies as far as the interplay between 
collective identities and the domestic order is concerned.
Starting with Israel, Israeli society is extremely complex, diversified and heterogeneous. It is 
often described as a mosaic, with a large number of distinctive collective identities coexisting, 
competing and occasionally clashing with each other in the political arena. Emerging with the 
creation of the Israeli state in 1948, Israeli identity is a relatively new construct. As the Israeli state 
extended the right to acquire Israeli citizenship to Jews all over the world, the collective identity of 
Israeli society was constructed as a pre-eminently Jewish one.3 This ethno-religious definition of 
the Israeli collective entails an overlap as well as a tension between the “Israeli” and the “Jewish” 
collective identities at the political and the societal level (Evron 1995). Moreover, it excludes 
Israel’s non-Jewish citizens – roughly 20 per cent of Israeli citizens – from the Israeli collective 
(Kimmerling 1993: 415). Herewith related, it is important to note that not all Israeli citizens define 
themselves as “Israelis” or primarily so. This concerns many, if not most, Palestinian citizens of 
Israel, who, for political and cultural reasons, would not identify as “Israelis”. But it also includes 
large parts of the Jewish ultra-Orthodox (haredi) community who have remained anti-Zionists and 
3 The so-called Law of Return of 1950, which allows every Jewish person and their descendants over three generations 
to immigrate to Israel and become an Israeli citizen, well reflects this state of affairs, as do the official holiday cycle and 
the symbols of the state (Zerubavel 1995: 219).
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define themselves primarily through their Jewish religion or ethnicity. Other groups and individuals 
may also identify as Jewish first. Altogether, sub-identities (or “sub-cultures”) have remained 
strong in Israel, often challenging the construction of the supposedly overarching Israeli identity 
(Kimmerling 2001). The mosaic of Israel’s collective identities is also marked by very different 
cultural groups and ethnicities, including Moroccan, Polish, Yemeni and Ethiopian Jews (to name 
but a few), but also Druze and Palestinians, with most communities having a very different history 
and, partly, status.4 In addition to the older communities, between 2005 and 2013, around 60,000 
African refugees and asylum seekers (mostly Eritrean and Sudanese) entered Israel. At present 
their number is estimated at over 35,000 people.5
Against this backdrop, a number of important fault lines characterize Israeli society and politics 
in terms of collective identities. Four major fault lines can be identified here (Del Sarto 2006: ch. 
4). The first one is the classical left–right divide, which mainly pits supporters of Labour Zionism 
and Revisionist Zionists against each other. This fault line revolves around the preferred policies 
vis-à-vis the Israeli–Palestinian and wider Arab–Israeli conflicts, with Labour Zionism being more 
open to territorial compromise with the Palestinians than supporters of Revisionist Zionism, who 
are territorial maximalists. The latter group includes Likud voters and religious or nationalist 
supporters of Israel’s settlement project in the Palestinian territories. Economic policies – 
egalitarian/social vs neo-liberal preferences – also play a role in this divide, although economic 
issues have traditionally been subordinated to the political–territorial question. The second 
major fault line is the Jewish–Palestinian one. In a state that defines itself as Jewish, most of the 
Palestinian (or Arab) citizens of Israel have remained second-class citizens at best, while Arab 
political parties have never participated in government coalitions. Israel’s Palestinian population 
is quite diverse, comprising, inter alia, nationalists, secularists, Islamists, conservatives, liberals, 
Bedouins, Muslims and several Christian denominations. The Jewish–Palestinian fault line in 
Israel largely overlaps with the divide separating Zionists from non-Zionists;6 many Palestinian-
Israeli citizens would prefer to see Israel become a “state of all its citizens” (instead of a “Jewish 
state”), as the current debate about the Jewish nation-state law illustrates. The third major fault 
line is the secular–religious divide, which mainly concerns the Jewish majority. This fault line 
is important given that there is no clear separation between state and religion in Israel, with 
Jewish religious parties having always been represented in the Israeli parliament and usually 
in government coalitions as well. Yet it is important to note here that both the religious and the 
secular camps are far from being homogeneous: the secularists may comprise human rights 
and LGBTQ activists as well as supporters of a two-state solution with the Palestinians, but also 
fervent nationalists and territorial maximalists, and everything in between. Similarly, the religious 
sector not only includes different religious sects but also ultra-Orthodox and national-religious 
4 The older communities are the Palestinians and the Druze, along with some ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities, 
followed by East European Jews who started immigrating to mandatory Palestine in the late 19th century. Middle Eastern 
Jews came to Israel in the 1950s. The so-called “Russian” Jews (hailing from the former Soviet Union after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall) and the Ethiopian Jewish community immigrated more recently.
5 While Israeli governments have adopted a restrictive policy towards these immigrants, including deportations, 
“voluntary repatriations” and the fortification of the border with Egypt, the African asylum seekers add to the group of 
residents of Israel without citizenship rights. Incidentally, this group of Israeli residents also includes the approximately 
300,000 Palestinian citizens of East Jerusalem (who are “permanent residents”) as well as foreign workers.
6 Israel’s ultra-Orthodox Jewish community also defines itself as non-Zionist or anti-Zionist as they consider the 
creation of Israel through human hand as a blasphemy.
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Jews, which have very different positions towards the state and its institutions. The fourth fault 
line separates Jews of European origin (Ashkenazim) – Israel’s founding generation – from Jews 
from Arab and Asian countries (Mizrahim), most of whom immigrated later to Israel and who for 
decades remained overrepresented in the lower socio-economic classes. The Ashkenazi–Mizrahi 
divide may have become less relevant in recent years. However, it is worth noting that it also 
divides Israel’s Jewish Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox communities into different groups, each with 
its own spiritual leader(s) and political representation. Finally, with regard to the political salience 
of these collective identities, it is important to note that Israel has a purely proportional electoral 
system with a relatively low threshold (currently set at 3.25 per cent). Hence, many of the different 
collective identities at the societal level tend to be represented in the political realm, where they 
may compete with each other for resources and power.
Turning briefly to the Turkish case, collective identities in Turkey have historically existed and 
continued to thrive despite successive governments’ attempts to crystallize Turkish identity as a 
homogeneous and secular dominating force confronting society’s peripheral masses (Yılmaz 2008, 
Keyman 2012).7 In Turkey, religion and ethnicity are seen as the two main determinants that define 
clear cleavages in society and shape the debate on identities. As far as the religious element is 
concerned, four collective identities – Alevis, non-Muslims, secularists and Sunni conservatives – 
can be detected, each of which is further differentiated internally according to other dimensions. 
In particular, the balance between the secular groups and the conservative ones has traditionally 
been one of the main points of contention at the societal and political levels as much as the 
cleavages built around ethnicity. In this regard, the main distinction is made between the “Turks” 
and the “Kurds”, whose mutual relations have been subject to major ups and downs over time. 
From a historical perspective, the identity debate within Turkey’s Kurdish community has evolved 
over the claim for the “recognition of difference” (Keyman 2012: 468), which has led to the Kurdish 
identity being perceived as having a greater “political face” in comparison with other collective 
identities. It must be noted that these collective identities continue to exist in a very intertwined 
social environment and no identity group is homogeneous in itself, being constituted by a number 
of diverging political opinions or ideologies.
Finally, Morocco and Tunisia display similar features as far as far the place in society of collective 
identities and their political role is concerned. Morocco is an Arab-Muslim country. Most of the 
population is officially Muslim (99 per cent), and more specifically Sunni, and the other 1 per 
cent includes Christians, Baha’i and Jews. From the ethnic point of view it includes both Arabs 
and Berbers. Berbers (or Amazigh) are considered the native population of North Africa and are 
estimated to represent about 35 per cent of the Moroccan population. Today they closely intermingle 
with Arabs, and bilingualism – the standardized version of Berber languages is Tamazight – is a 
common characteristic in modern Morocco. However, until recently they have been among the 
most marginalized groups of the population from a cultural, linguistic and economic perspective. 
Although they have actively participated in the fight for independence, they have been sidelined in 
the narrative centred on nationalism, which emphasizes the Arab and Islamic components of the 
Moroccan identity (Karimi 2016). This national narrative was instrumental in forging a common 
7 The centre–periphery dichotomy is extensively used in the analysis of state–society relations in Turkey. This 
theoretical framework was first used by Mardin (1973) to examine the cleavages in late Ottoman and early republican 
Turkish politics.
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sense of belonging: “even though we have multifaceted ethnic and cultural components, Moroccan 
society is quite homogeneous. After independence we went through a ‘Morocconization’ of our 
identity. First of all, we are Moroccans”, claimed one interviewee (Interview 35).
The mosaic of Morocco’s society is characterized by two important fault lines. The first one is the 
Islamist–secularist divide, which is also projected onto the organized social and political levels. 
The largest political parties/movements with Islamist orientation are the moderate Islamist 
Justice and Development Party (PJD) and Al-Adl Wa’l Ihsane (AWI), alongside a range of Salafi 
groups of different orientations. The PJD is a political party that shares some affinities with the 
Muslim Brotherhood and stands for a strategic alliance with the monarchy. The pragmatism of 
the party brought its members to power in 2011 and in 2016 after the legislative elections. AWI is 
a political movement, not legalized but tolerated, with a rigid hierarchical structure. It considers 
the monarchy a “compulsory authority”, aims to establish a civil state and questions the fact that 
the king bears the title of “Commander of the Faithful”, one of the cornerstones of the Moroccan 
monarchy’s legitimacy. Secularists, usually referring to themselves as “modernists”, are generally 
defined in opposition to Islamists. Historically they were identified with the political Left (e.g., the 
Communist party is one of the oldest Moroccan parties), whereas liberals were sponsored by the 
monarchy as a counterweight to the Left. All in all and contrary to other Arab countries, in Morocco 
Islamists and secularists have traditionally tended to cooperate in building up an inclusive political 
order (Masbah 2014). The second fault line is the loyalist–republican divide, which is more difficult 
to define: on the one hand, it is not publicly acknowledged due to the important role played by the 
monarchy as the cornerstone of the whole political system; on the other hand, “the differences 
between Islamists, Loyalists and Modernists are not sharp because there are a lot of interrelations 
between these groups” (Interview 44). The relative simplicity of the political dimension of Morocco’s 
collective identities has traditionally been the result of a non-pluralistic political arena and of the 
repeated episodes of state violence against dissidents and activists. By contrast, a great number 
of civil society groups – such as those devoted to gender or human rights – have been created 
as a way to foster participation, bypassing the empty political parties. In this regard, one of the 
respondents argued that
in Morocco associations have always existed. Some of them were linked to the political 
forces and were initiated by them; others, such as religious associations, created, 
inversely, political parties; while others were launched to overcome political parties. Civil 
society has always played an important role in the democratization of the country. We did 
not have a revolution but an evolution. (Interview 43)
The discussion about Tunisia should start from what, according to a number of authors, are the 
main factors responsible for the ingrained general climate that favours moderation and consensus 
at both the societal and the political levels. Among the factors quoted are the relative homogeneity 
of the Tunisian population in terms of religious and ethnic affiliations – 98 per cent are Sunni 
Muslim Arabs, most of whom belong to the Maliki school. The country also hosts well-integrated 
Berber (1 per cent of the total population), Jewish and European communities. Another factor that 
is often acknowledged as having had an impact on the country’s modern and contemporary history 
and state–society relations, up to the 2011 revolution, is the relatively high level of education of 
the population. If one takes the Human Development Index (HDI), which captures three basic 
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dimensions of human development – health, education and income – between 1980 and 2012, 
Tunisia’s HDI rose by 1.9 per cent annually, going from 0.459 to 0.712, and was 0.725 in 2015, 
which places Tunisia above the level of most countries in the MENA region (Murphy 2013: 242, 
Zlitni and Touati 2012). Moving from this relatively homogeneous situation and high standards in 
key indicators capturing societal well-being in spite of the repressive and authoritarian political 
situation prior to 2011, Tunisia’s trajectory in the past seven years is even more remarkable in 
terms of the opening up of spaces for collective identities to play a more pluralistic and hybrid role 
in shaping state–society relations.
2. PLURALIZATION/HYBRIDIZATION VS ENTRENCHMENT/POLARIZATION 
OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES IN THE MENA
A number of factors have led to changes in the role of collective identities throughout the MENA 
region, a dynamic that has taken different forms in different countries. Although not all the MENA 
countries have experienced it yet, it is nevertheless worth shedding light on this dynamic in 
order to grasp potential future developments and the impact it is already having on the domestic 
political and institutional processes in some places and potentially on the region as a whole. In 
this respect, it is possible to discern two main opposing trends that stand in a dichotomy. The 
first trend is the pluralization and hybridization of collective identities under the impact of the 
(temporary in certain cases) opening up of the societal and political landscapes. The Moroccan 
case is illustrative of this trend, which can be further defined as the growing to maturity and 
in some cases the rapprochement of previously existing collective identities. In February 2011, 
thousands of Moroccans took to the streets to demand democracy, an end to corruption, more 
justice and economic reforms. In Morocco, as opposed to other MENA countries, the revolutionary 
moment, which started as a reformist movement, has not led to the ousting of the regime in 
power or to violent civil war. In the words of one respondent: “everything has changed for 
everything to remain the same: the country is still a constitutional monarchy with a centralized 
power in the hands of the king, Mohammed VI, and the demands of the population have only been 
partially met” (Interview 37). However, 2011 has undoubtedly influenced the reconfiguration of 
state–society relations on the basis of the pluralization and hybridization of those groups that, 
building on ethnic, religious and/or ideological self-identification, have been at the forefront of 
contestation and political action during and after the uprisings of 2011. Domestic order-making 
has been affected as well, as partially new and hybrid patterns of political and institutional activity 
have started to emerge that transcend or escape the processes and categories known in the 
past. The pluralization/hybridization of Morocco’s collective identities has to be understood as an 
expansion of those that already existed, as was stressed by all the interviewees, rather than as an 
increase in their number. Although most respondents belonging to civil society were unanimous 
in declaring that they “have always existed” (Interviews 36, 37, 38, 39), they were also equally 
prone to acknowledge the widespread feeling that 2011 had changed people’s perceptions of the 
political arena. “People feel more legitimized to protest” (Interview 41) and “people are less afraid 
and there is less repression” (Interviews 36, 38, 40) were two of the most commonly heard replies. 
Others stressed, however, that “the state is still very harsh with activists” (Interviews 35, 39, 41, 
42) and all of them agreed on the fact that “there are still three topics that cannot be debated: the 
monarchy, Islam and the Western Sahara”.
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In Morocco, several collective identities were subsumed under the umbrella of a broad group known 
as the 20th February Movement. “For the first time in the history of modern Morocco, all members 
of the opposition movements, associations, individuals and parties gathered under the umbrella 
of one single movement surmounting psychological and organization barriers”, argued one of the 
interviewees (Interview 35). In reality, Morocco already had a history of cooperation between the 
Islamists and the secularists in its recent past (Masbah 2014). This trend was reinforced in 2011 
when the Islamists and leftist parties joined forces – Al-Adl Wa’l Ihsane and the Federation of the 
Democratic Left composed of the Socialist Unified Party, the Socialist Democratic Vanguard Party 
and the National Ittihadi Congress – to demand more justice, freedom and dignity. “Since 2011 
we have experienced a rapprochement between Islamists and leftist parties. We are experiencing 
a mélange of identities”, argued one interviewee (Interview 36). More than forty associations 
and parties have joined and supported the 20th February Movement, a horizontal movement, 
transversal to civil society, composed mainly of self-organized youth with a very active presence 
on the Web and on social media (Hoffmann and König 2013). The movement succeeded in creating 
a common platform among a broad and diversified group of societal and political actors. The 
progressive forces of the movement were mainly composed of young activists who in most cases 
were the “kids” of the militants that had opposed the Moroccan regime during the “Years of Lead” 
(Hivert 2015: 672). The other components of the movement were leftist parties’ youth sections, 
civil society organizations (CSOs) and civic groups such as the Moroccan Association for Human 
Rights (AMDH), the Alternative Movement for Individual freedoms (MALI), the National Union of 
Moroccan Students (UNEM) and independent activists with diverse backgrounds: Trotskyists, 
Marxists–Leninists, Maoists, liberals, anarchists, diplomats, the unemployed and Amazigh. “For 
the first time, the recognition of the Amazigh as an official language became a slogan chanted by 
the crowd at a national level. For us it was a victory and a recognition of the work we had done 
previously”, commented one Amazigh interviewee (Interview 38). Before 2011, only a few political 
actors had defended the claims for recognition and empowerment voiced by the Amazigh minority. 
However, despite this new sense of cohesion and common purpose, the reality on the ground tells 
a different story. The Amazigh movement was deeply heterogeneous and encompassed a number 
of approaches and points of view vis-à-vis the other collective identities and the role of the state. 
This heterogeneity presented an obstacle because it caused organizational problems in light of 
the fact that the majority of the Amazigh associations did not have funds or access to training. “In 
2015 we created a coalition that brought together 100 associations”, argued one of the Amazigh 
interviewees, “but two thirds of them are practically dormant: they do not have experience in 
lobbying at the national and international levels and do not have a budget. This is entirely due to 
internal reasons” (Interview 39).
As discussed in the next section, the quick approval of the new Moroccan constitution in July 
2011 and the PJD’s victory in the November 2011 elections led to several splits in the unity of the 
different collective identities that had previously coalesced around the 20th February Movement. 
The fragmentation of the movement and the (re)emergence of particularistic claims had in reality 
started earlier with the debate on gender equality (Borrillo 2017: 115). The gender equality question 
was not among the first battles of the movement,8 and only became important at a later time. This 
occurred when rural women, known as Sulaliyyates, who are at the forefront of struggles over 
land rights, housing and political representation in Morocco, staged yet another protest in front of 
8 February 20th Movement, Morocco Campaign (video), 16 February 2011, https://youtu.be/S0f6FSB7gxQ.
Middle East and North Africa Regional Architecture: 
Mapping Geopolitical Shifts, Regional Order and Domestic Transformations
12
WORKING PAPERS
No. 14, October 2018
the parliament in Rabat with the support of the Democratic Association of Morocco’s Women after 
the large mobilizations in 2009 (Mandraud 2011). Since then, issues related to the role of women 
and the recognition of gender equality as a human rights issue started to occupy centre stage in 
the debates and claims of the 20th February Movement and to crack it from within. It is possible 
to argue that the gender issue is pivotal to understand the confrontation between the different 
identities of the movement and in particular between the secularists and the Islamists and among 
the women’s groups themselves. While, on the one hand, the secular forces of the movement 
chanted “women and men have the same rights”, walking together during the demonstrations, 
the Islamists chanted “women and men are the same towards militancy” and walked separately 
(Borrillo 2017: 117). The approval of the constitution fragmented the fragile women’s union once 
and for all. Several women’s associations were satisfied with the adoption of Article 19, which 
calls for gender equality. Other, more radical groups, such as the coalition Printemps Feminist 
pour la Démocratie et l’Egalité, left the movement or remained but contested the idea that the 
constitution represented a significant change in terms of gender equality (Borrillo 2017: 117). The 
rift between the secular groups and the Islamists also grew wider and wider. A female respondent 
from one of the secular women’s groups stated: “I do not understand how we can fight together. 
When we speak about women’s rights we speak about equality whereas the Islamists speak about 
‘complementarity’”. (Interview 40)
Other members of the secular women’s groups questioned the alliance with the Islamists on the 
ground that
our aim is not the partial recognition of gender equality but of democracy and human rights, 
or rather individual rights that are not respected by them. Our idea of individual rights applies 
to freedom of consciousness and worship, which also includes the right to decide whether or 
not we want to do the Ramadan. (Interview 41)
To conclude on the Moroccan trajectory of collective identities pluralization and hybridization, 
the trend towards rapprochement among the different identities under the umbrella of the 20th 
February Movement in the wake of the popular unrest and the opening of some spaces for debate 
and expression turned out to be instrumental. When the monarchy quickly managed to assert its 
control over the transition process – concretely through the King’s speech to the nation on 9 March 
2011 outlining the steps in the revision of the constitution – and to take the steam out of the protest 
movement, the different identities themselves started to feel more secure in the comfort zone of 
their particularistic claims, thus leading to the fragmentation of the 20th February Movement and 
to its political and institutional irrelevance.
The Tunisian case provides another example of the pluralization/hybridization of collective 
identities in the MENA, although it distances itself from the Moroccan trend of rapprochement 
followed by renewed fragmentation discussed above. In the aftermath of the revolution of January 
2011, debates around identity issues have grown significantly and have had an impact on the 
political and institutional development of the country (Interview 11). While before 2011 identity-
related issues were generally regarded as taboo – to protect the seemingly homogeneous Arab-
Muslim nature of Tunisian identity and the peaceful character of the country – the watershed of 
the revolution provided a space and opportunity for societal differences, new claims and a new 
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discourse around the role of minorities to emerge. This discourse has been powerfully framed 
within the “right to diversity” language (droit à la différence) thanks to the relentless work of 
Tunisian civil society. Against this backdrop, it is possible to understand the extent to which the 
pluralization of collective identities has been a key driving force of societal dynamism and political 
activism in the period 2011–14, and to many people this process represents a structural change for 
the country (Interview 13). “Between January and October 2011 the political agenda was set by civil 
society as it turned out to have grown stronger than the political parties in the ARP [the Assembly 
of the Representatives of the People – Assemblée des représentants du peuple]”, argued one 
of the interviewees (Interview 12). For example, fault lines have started to emerge among those 
that define their political identity in terms of being Muslim, with a distinction between moderate/
pragmatic Islamists (e.g., Ennahda) and more radical ones (e.g., Salafists), drawing an important 
line within the Muslim-Sunni Tunisian political identity (Voltolini and Colombo 2018). Another fault 
line that has been projected onto Tunisian society for the first time is that between Arab and 
Amazigh, moving up the ladder from the individual level to the national one through the collective 
level. To be fair, collective identities in Tunisia have always been heterogeneous. However, what 
has been transformed since 2011 as a result of the changing political circumstances has been 
the perception of these identities by the people themselves and, most importantly, the fact that “a 
new opportunity structure has emerged whereby it was for the first time possible to claim ‘to be 
something else’ and ‘to act differently’” (Interview 12). Another interviewee argued that
after 2011 Tunisian people have realized that they are not a homogeneous category. 
Different collective identities have started to define them and this process has led to a 
growing confrontation and sometimes conflict among different groups as a means to 
construct these identities. (Interview 16)
The pluralization/hybridization of collective identities in Tunisia has taken two forms. The first is 
the fragmentation or “explosion” of previously existing collective identities. It has been observed 
that collective identities have “exploded” and have given rise to a number of sub-identities that 
have put forth claims and competed for recognition and power. This is apparent also in terms of 
the ways in which collective identities, which used to be regarded and treated as homogeneous 
by the state, have revealed fissures, and dynamics of competition and conflict have emerged. The 
fragmentation of the groups that mobilize around women’s issues is representative of this trend. 
Although women’s empowerment has traditionally been a key area for civic activism, in the past 
this has taken place within the strict boundaries of what was allowed by the authoritarian regimes 
of Bourghiba and of Ben Ali. The Union Nationale de la Femme Tunisienne (UNFT), created in 1956 
upon the country’s independence, was traditionally co-opted by the ruling authorities to show 
that they had an agenda on women’s issues. The Union was the mouthpiece for a form of “elitist 
feminism” or “feminism de l’état” (Interview 18). The creation of the Association Tunisienne des 
Femmes Démocrates in 1989 and, in particular, its becoming the strongest voice for the women’s 
emancipation movement in the post-Ben Ali era is an example of the pluralization of collective 
identities in Tunisia and of the hybridization in the tone of the claims of the women’s movement. 
More than that, the activism around women’s issues after 2011 has been one of the key defining 
features of the Tunisian transition away from authoritarianism. Against the backdrop of a political 
landscape in flux, women’s activism after 2011 has not been monolithic and “lack of solidarity, 
antagonism and competition” have tended to prevail among the societal groups that have made 
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women’s issues the core of their cause (Interview 17). The main divide has been between the 
conservative/Islamist-leaning groups, on the one hand, and the progressive/secular ones, on the 
other. “This divide has impacted upon the very identity of women in unexpected ways and has 
created problems and conflicts among women who had been used to working together”, argued 
the same interviewee (Interview 17).
Turning to the second form of the pluralization/hybridization of collective identities in Tunisia, this 
can be defined as the “bubbling up” of new, previously repressed or dormant collective identities. 
Contrary to the previous form of pluralization/hybridization exemplified by the trajectory of women’s 
issues and claims, the collective identities that have bubbled up to the surface and come to the 
fore had previously been either non-existent or unorganized and silent. This has been the case, 
for example, of the militant groups mobilized around LGBTQ issues and rights. These groups have 
multiplied in number and have gained substantial visibility as a result of the “embeddedness” of 
their discourses within transnational/global trends (e.g., the spread of technology, communication) 
(Interview 13). This has been accompanied by demands for better representation and more 
inclusiveness, which have been couched in terms of heightened identity self-consciousness. 
Another example is represented by the youth as a subgroup within collective identities. After 2011 
the space for youth to take part in civic-activism – and to a lesser extent political – initiatives has 
multiplied. However, as in other Arab countries the Tunisian youth have become divided along 
ideological, religious and mainly socio-economic fault lines. This was already apparent during 
the January 2011 revolution when “the youth in the cities protested for civil rights while the youth 
in the countryside took to the streets for better economy conditions” (Interviews 16, 22). Further 
evidence of this split is the fact that the protests of January 2018 took place almost exclusively in 
the countryside.
Two further examples drawn from the Tunisian case exemplify this, both of which are tied to 
geographical disparities and to the long history of marginalization experienced by some regions 
and territories since independence (Bono et al. 2015). In the light of the important role played by 
the peripheries in setting the stage for the January 2011 revolution, regional and local collective 
identities have been sharpened thereafter vis-à-vis the central powers (Interview 11). In particular, 
some CSOs from the interior regions (e.g., Sidi Bouzid, Kasserine) have been the carriers of specific 
claims built around their identity as groups from marginalized and dispossessed territories. 
While advancing these claims, previously hidden tribal identities have even been constructed with 
reference to certain regions (e.g., Sfax). In the words of one interviewee, “tribalism has partially 
re-appeared in Tunisia – not as a political phenomenon but as a way to affirm local identities 
that were not sufficiently taken into account at the national level” (Interview 13). According to 
other respondents, this new self-affirmation of regional and local collective identities is rather 
instrumental, intended to gain more voice at the national level through the work of CSOs. Nuances 
in the cultural, language and customs-related expressions across the Tunisian regions – often 
depicted as caricatures – are increasingly highlighted by journalists and commentators to speak 
of this pluralization/hybridization of collective identities in the country (Interview 18). Special 
mention in this regard should be made to the emergence of the Amazigh identity in Tunisia, which 
has gained visibility through demonstrations and public actions and claims often inspired by the 
experience of the Moroccan Amazigh groups. This is a clear example of the working of the principle 
of the “right to diversity” that was forcefully proclaimed in Tunisia after the revolution of 2011.
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The second trend discussed in this report is the entrenchment and polarization of previously 
existing collective identities. Both Turkey and Israel exemplify this, albeit in different respects and 
with different implications. In the case of Turkey, the salience of identity politics stems from the fact 
that “identity groups in Turkey are interpreted on the basis of their political influence”, as expressed 
by one interviewee (Interview 1). Identity dynamics and their impact on state–society relations 
have become a featured topic of the social and political agenda, especially during the phase of 
opening and democratization ushered in by Turkey’s European Union accession process. Although 
marked by a number of ups and down, the framework of EU–Turkey relations did influence the 
rights-based policy-making approach implemented by the authorities towards certain collective 
identities. The 2013 reform package, which aimed at catering to the demands of different identity 
groups through steps such as restoring non-Muslims’ property rights and boosting the rights of 
the Alevis, was significant in this respect. This trend has also shaped by the identity-oriented 
discourse that the political elites themselves have increasingly made use of in the past decade. In 
parallel to this opening, societal self-identification in Turkey has veered towards the conservative 
groups, which had been previously excluded from public life and service. “Religious values have 
found a legitimate place in the public sphere and the demands of the lower middle class have been 
better looked after”, argued one interviewee (Interview 4). The conservatives’ growing visibility 
both in politics and at the civil society level is believed to have led to a feeling of exclusion among 
certain segments of the secular community, once the pivot of Turkish society. This process has 
been accompanied by one of “self-criticism” among the secular community, especially after the 
failed coup attempt, over the exclusion of the conservatives from “the history of the Republic” 
(Gündoğar and Görgülü 2017: 19). It is thus possible to observe that the post-15 July environment 
has led to the lifting of the established bias against a previously disadvantaged social group in 
society and – more importantly – to the entrenchment of nationalist sentiments and tendencies. 
These have become the pole of attraction for a variety of identity groups across the conservative–
secular spectrum and beyond. As a result, neither conservative nor secular-minded people are 
seen as “monolithic” blocs any longer (Interview 2).
Nevertheless, polarization at the level of the main ethnic and religious cleavages can be partially 
observed. Being perceived as a minority, the core demands of the Kurdish community in terms of 
the recognition of their right to citizenship without implications for their ethnicity, the opportunity 
to use their mother language in education and the general enhancement of democratic standards 
have mostly received palliative treatment. While acknowledging the efforts made by the Turkish 
authorities, the perception among the Kurdish population is that public and educational initiatives, 
such as the neighbourhood councils and the Kurdish-language courses operating especially in 
the south-eastern part of Turkey, have had a limited impact on changing their status. Against 
this backdrop, the onset of the civil war in Syria and its regional repercussions have created the 
conditions for a hardening of the Kurdish collective identity and of their claims and – since 2015 
– for the reigniting of inter-communal tensions particularly but not exclusively in areas inhabited 
mostly by Kurds. On the other side, religious subgroups such as the Alevis and Turkey’s non-Muslim 
population have opted for a more conciliatory approach. On the one hand, the institutional growth 
of Alevis was characterized by more inclusiveness and moderation (Göner 2005). Their claims are 
primarily focused on the maintenance of social peace, equal citizenship, freedom of religion and 
belief (e.g., the removal of compulsory religious courses from state education) and the recognition 
of Cemevis as a place of worship (Genç et al. 2017, Tol 2017). The Alevi identity has benefited 
Middle East and North Africa Regional Architecture: 
Mapping Geopolitical Shifts, Regional Order and Domestic Transformations
16
WORKING PAPERS
No. 14, October 2018
in terms of gaining visibility from the partial political and societal opening discussed above and 
relaxation of state policies that started between 2010 and 2013–14 as part of the government’s 
reform agenda targeting minority rights in the context of Turkey’s EU accession.
When there is a convergence of interests, it creates an advantageous environment 
between two sides as witnessed during the Alevi opening. In that period, the visibility of 
the Alevi identity was heightened through the visits of high-profile statesmen to Cemevis. 
The Alevis are generally backed by secular-oriented political groups, yet for now they are 
waiting for a new political actor to bring them to the centre of discussion. (Interview 5).
However, the regional circumstances sparked by the Syrian conflict and the rise of the ISIS threat 
have raised concerns among the Alevis that they too could be targeted by the jihadists. Although 
Syrian Alawites and Turkey’s Alevi community are linked by only distant ties, it is understood that 
what the Alawites in Syria have suffered has generated anxiety to a certain extent among the Alevi 
community in Turkey, leading them to turn inwards (Tol 2017: 10).
On the other hand, Turkey’s non-Muslim groups are relatively seen as less active in the political 
sphere and their rights-based claims mostly revolve around the recognition of autonomy in the 
elections of their religious representatives, the management of community schools and cultural 
rights – compared with other collective identities. It can be argued, in the words of one interviewee, 
that “they act like an audience amidst the developments happening around the country. When 
there is an issue challenging their identity-based claims, their voice is much clearer. Otherwise, 
they prefer not to intervene and to live their own lives within their own community” (Interview 1). 
This does not mean, however, that non-Muslims show indifference towards their acquired rights.
Another example of the growing entrenchment/polarization of collective identities is the case of 
Israel. Israel was obviously not affected by the Arab uprisings, although it did witness a popular 
protest movement against the high costs of living in the summer of 2011. The major changes 
affecting Israeli politics and society in recent years were triggered by events that happened well 
before the start of the Arab uprisings, most chiefly the breakdown of the Oslo peace process and 
the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada in late September 2000 with its numerous terrorist 
attacks. These events triggered a notable shift to the right in Israeli politics and the collapse of 
the Zionist Left; subsequent conflicts with Hamas and Hezbollah and the inflammatory rhetoric 
of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad additionally contributed to the creation of a general 
sense of being under attack in Israel (Del Sarto 2017). Engaging in the politics of insecurity, Israeli 
governments have relentlessly promoted and amplified this sense of besiegement. Traditionally 
heated political debates have been replaced by a general acceptance of a no-compromise approach 
to security and the Palestinians, with consecutive right-wing governments pushing maximalist 
territorial ambitions. The consensus that emerged in Israeli policies and that persists today is 
based on the worldview of classical revisionist Zionism with its perception of an inherently hostile 
environment – hence the need for forceful policies and deterrence. However, it is also infused 
with ethno-religious conceptions of politics and messianic beliefs. This neo-revisionist credo has 
remained the ideology of the Likud as well as of the settler movement, whereby religious beliefs 
and security considerations have become increasingly intertwined (Klein 2010: ch. 3). Israeli society 
has undoubtedly remained heterogeneous, but it has also become “more closed and frightened”, 
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as one interviewee put it (Interview 23).
Furthermore, the polarization and distance between different collective identities and groups 
have grown stronger. Almost all interviewees identified this as a significant development in recent 
years, to the point that some feared that Israel’s social cohesion was at risk (Interviews 24, 25). 
The growing polarization of collective identities is particularly visible regarding the divide between 
the political Right and a tremendously weakened political Left. By now, the hegemonic Israeli 
narrative points to the threats that Israel is facing, which besides terrorism and allegedly sinister 
Iranian ambitions also include all those (both abroad and at home) who “hide behind the mask of 
anti-Zionism to de-legitimize Israel or even to deny it its right to exist” (Interview 26). Concurrently, 
Israeli settlers may warn of the “traitors”, those Israelis and international activists who “come to 
insult us and who together with the Palestinians come to make our life harder” (Interview 27). A 
growing polarization also seems to have occurred along the secular–religious divide. While this 
divide has a long history in Israeli politics, both sides seem to have the impression that they are 
the weaker one. However, religious preferences have undoubtedly become much stronger in Israel 
(including all denominations), with the religious population having grown considerably in recent 
decades due to higher birth rates. Moreover, it is not irrelevant that most Jewish religious parties 
have participated in right-wing government coalitions since the 2000s. The religious settler 
movement has also grown stronger, both demographically and politically. As Israel is “not moving 
in the direction of secularism and the inclusion of difference” (Interview 30), progressive-liberal 
activists feel as if they are facing an uphill battle. However, things are not black and white in this 
realm: for instance, the LGBTQ movement “enjoys good health” in Israel (Interview 23) and secular 
feminist activists may join forces with female religious activists in their fight for the right of women 
to pray at the Western Wall in Jerusalem (i.e., Women of the Wall) (Interview 30). Moreover, the 
growing strength of religious conservativism in Israeli society is somewhat counterbalanced by 
the approximately one million people who immigrated to Israel from the former Soviet Union 
after it collapsed, and who are generally not very religious. This segment of Israeli society has 
strong representation at the government level, a fact that contributes to the growing religious–
secular polarization. Thus, the Yisrael Beyiteinu party led by Avigdor Lieberman, which caters to 
the collective of “Russian” Israelis, has initiated a number of “secularist” bills, aiming for instance 
at the adoption of faster conversion procedures and the drafting of haredi Jews into the Israeli 
army. The ultra-Orthodox community, which is non-Zionist and therefore feels very distant from 
the problems of the Israeli state, is particularly threatened by the prospect of being forced to serve 
in the military. As one haredi interviewee put it, “Israel does not concern me”, stressing that “I do 
not want to talk about the State of Israel. I am not a Zionist and I do not participate in the politics of 
this country” (Interview 31). In general, the ultra-Orthodox religious sector seems to be concerned 
by what it perceives as a growing secularization, the “lack of true spirituality” (Interview 31) and 
the growing disconnect from religious teachings and traditions (Interview 25).
As regards the Arab–Jewish divide, the growing power of the neo-revisionist Right is undoubtedly 
affecting the relationship between the Jewish majority and the Arab-Palestinian minority in Israel.9 
The discourse adopted by consecutive right-wing Israeli governments, which depicts the Palestinian 
9 While Palestinian citizens of Israel were never fully included in the Israeli collective, many (if not most) of them 
consider themselves anti-Zionists or non-Zionists – if Zionists are defined as those “who come to this land thinking that 
it belongs to them, thinking of having the opportunity and the right to drive me out of my house” (Interview 32).
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citizens as a “fifth column”, only contributes to this growing divide. Concurrently, the mainstream 
media regularly warns of the “radicalization” of the Arab-Israeli public and their leaders (Peleg 
and Waxman 2011). In parallel, the objective of wanting to strengthen the Jewish character of 
the state, as expressed by right-wing and religious political activists as a major objective of their 
activities (Interviews 25, 26), obviously increases the tensions between the Jewish majority and 
the Arab minority. The recent law defining Israel as the Jewish nation-state is a case in point: 
this law reserves collective rights and the right to self-determination to the Jewish collective 
only (Lis and Landau 2018). And while Palestinian citizens of Israel tend to see the settlers and 
right-wing voters as “the other” (Interview 33), the perception expressed by one Israeli settler that 
“the Knesset is still full of anti-Semites and murderers” (by which she meant the Arab Knesset 
members) (Interview 27) does not bode well for the future of Arab–Jewish relations in Israel either. 
Finally, whereas the Ashkenazi–Mizrahi fault line and the political underrepresentation of the 
Mizrahim and Sephardim seems to have become less salient (Interviews 25, 34), a new fault line 
has been emerging, namely the one between rich and poor, adding an additional layer of societal 
fragmentation. The background of this development is the fact that Israel has moved from an 
originally egalitarian and socialist-oriented society in its founding years to an OECD country that in 
2013 ranked fifth in terms of income inequality (after Chile, Mexico, Turkey and the United States). 
At the political level, this development is reflected in the growing importance of socio-economic 
issues in the political debate. Some political parties have even profited from this development 
(such as Yesh Atid and Kulanu), presenting themselves as champions of greater socio-economic 
equality. While the divide between rich and poor largely transcends collective identities, it is 
important to note that the Arab citizens of Israel and the ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities are 
overrepresented among the poorest segments of Israeli society.10 Indeed, the income of about one 
in five Israeli households falls below the relative poverty line; among the Arab citizens of Israel 
and the ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities, over one in two households is poor (OECD 2013, 
Dattel and Feldman 2013; see also OECD 2018: 15-6, Dattel 2017).
3. ASSESSING THE CONTRIBUTION OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES TO 
DOMESTIC ORDER-MAKING IN THE MENA
Studying collective identities in the MENA region offers advantages from multiple standpoints. 
Firstly, it helps deconstruct the view according to which changes (or lack thereof) at the societal 
level (the civil society recalled at the beginning) tend to be subsumed under more important and 
impactful transformations in the political society once political and institutional processes are 
set in motion. On the contrary, the interplay between the two continues to unfold and to have an 
impact on state–society relations at large. Secondly, focusing on collective identities in the context 
of political and institutional development allows one to counter the risk of reifying identity politics. 
The last part of this report assesses the impact of the opposing trends in collective identities 
discussed above at the political and institutional levels. It dwells on the extent to which this dynamic 
has given rise to competing or alternative interests and claims and on whether states in the region 
have acted upon them and have successfully enshrined them in state institutions and policies. 
This last point is particularly important as it has a direct effect on the type of domestic order that 
is created and maintained. The analysis focuses on organized forms of political action and on 
10 The Ethiopian community is also overrepresented in the weaker socio-economic classes in Israeli society.
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institutional arrangements articulated around collective identities. Against this backdrop, identity 
politics can be studied at two different levels: the meso and the macro. On the one hand, the meso 
level of analysis is the level of organized collective behaviour, namely that of organized groups 
(e.g., political parties, networks, trade unions, charities, social movements) and of their actions 
and interactions. On the other hand, the macro level is the level of state policies and institutional 
structures (e.g., dominant social and cultural norms, constitutional legal systems, etc.). This level 
is particularly important in relation to the countries undergoing political transition processes.
By keeping these two levels of analysis in mind, it is possible to distinguish three trends when it 
comes to the impact of collective identities at the political and institutional levels. The first trend 
can be described as formal opening at the political level without substantive pluralism. This trend 
is exemplified by the Moroccan case. As already argued, with the adoption of the constitution in 
July 2011 and the victory of the PJD in the November 2011 elections the 20th February Movement 
lost traction and started to fragment. The main rift between the movement’s constituencies had 
to do with the support lent to the monarchy, which decided to take a proactive role in steering the 
political and institutional transition in the direction it desired (Dalmasso 2012). This was framed by 
most interviewees as the King’s successful attempt to “gradually neutralize” the opposition. “With 
the worsening of stability in the MENA region, the King rolled back the 2011 political opening. State 
repression has resumed and people have gone back to being scared”, argued one interviewee 
(Interview 36). It therefore appears that the pluralization/hybridization of collective identities in 
Morocco has shaped the domestic order ambiguously: on the one hand, the monarchy has had 
to take into account and respond to some of the claims made by the population (as in the case 
of the Amazigh) by opening up the political space and by initiating institutional reforms (e.g., the 
referendum on the new constitution). On the other hand, regional dynamics such as the civil wars 
in Libya and Syria and the rise of the jihadist threat in the MENA region were exploited by the 
monarchy as an excuse to end the political opening shortly thereafter.
All in all, the simple adoption of the new constitution – hailed as a big achievement by the monarchy 
and by some political parties – does not represent any meaningful and deep change either in 
the institutional architecture of the state or in how politics is made. The constitution was often 
described as “an empty shell” (Interview 38), or, to use a simile, as if “you receive the keys of a 
house but someone else has the double” (Interview 36), and finally as being “very ambiguous” 
(Interview 35). The adoption of the organic laws required to implement its provisions was delayed 
– and in some cases has yet to be completed – and for the most part this has happened without 
the participation of civil society. “The former government of Benkirane has claimed to involve 
the Amazigh community for the drafting of the organic law by creating an email where we could 
send our recommendations”, explained a disappointed member of the Amazigh community 
(Interview 39). The result of this lack of a participatory approach is an organic law adopted in 2016 
by the government (but still lacking the vote of the parliament) that does not concretely establish 
Tamazight as an official language. The ambiguity of this formal opening was stressed by another 
Amazigh representative:
we do not understand whether it is an official language or not. The law does not 
guarantee the fact that Tamazight should be used by professors and teachers in schools 
and universities, in the media and in the administration. Plus, they have created another 
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institution that should consider case by case whether it has to be used officially or not. 
(Interview 38)
The ambiguous character of the constitution has also been denounced by women’s associations. 
The Penal Code is in contrast to the principle of equality stressed by the constitution.
We had to wait until 2014 for the abolition of art. 475 of the Penal Code that provided that 
whoever ‘abducts or deceives’ a minor can escape prosecution and imprisonment if the 
abductor marries the victim. Moreover, the law against violence against women, which 
has been adopted recently [in February 2018], does not provide a definition of domestic 
violence and does not explicitly criminalize marital rape. (Interview 40)
Other institutions that have been inaugurated since 2011 in order to guarantee the democratic 
transformation of the country are seen in a slightly more positive light despite their ineffectiveness. 
One interviewee argued
The existence of the National Human Rights Council (NHRC), which should guarantee 
the respect of human rights, is a good thing although it is too weak. It is not independent, 
it has to submit its reports to the King before any publication and it does not address 
sensitive issues such as the Rif demonstrations that have been taking place in the North 
of the country since 2016. (Interview 42)
According to other respondents, the NHRC indeed “has an impact at the local level” and “it 
demonstrates the evolution of the political scene” (Interview 37). The most troubling evidence of the 
lack of true political opening following 2011 is the fact that freedom of expression is dangerously in 
retreat in Morocco. It is indeed common to hear people say they are scared: “we are followed and 
controlled during the whole day” (Interview 42). Others point to the fact that “the state today uses 
other instruments of repression such as newspapers that carry out defamatory campaigns against 
political activists” (Interview 37). Concerning the economic reforms, frustration is very high and 
most of the respondents consider the Rif demonstrations as the expression of this malaise.11 In 
the past year and a half peaceful protests have encompassed the whole range of socio-economic 
rights (more hospitals, schools, roads, jobs), giving birth to the social movement known as al-
Hirak – one of the longest-living protest movements in the region since the Arab uprisings. The 
response of the state to this peaceful popular mobilization has been twofold. On the one hand, it 
started (after nearly a year) to use an iron fist against the protesters and arrested the movement’s 
leader (Interview 44); on the other hand, around the same time two ministers (of the Interior and of 
Economic Development) had to resign in October 2017 and the PJD’s Prime Minister, Saâdeddine 
El Othmani, launched a plan for the economic development of the region. “The state knows that 
after the Arab uprisings they have to respond to the demands of the population. Or at least they 
pretend to do it”, argued one interviewee (Interview 44). For the time being, however, we can talk 
about “two-speed politics: the one led by society, which is quick and one by the state institutions, 
which is very slow” (Interview 36).
11 In October 2016, an Al Hoceima-based fishmonger was crushed to death in a rubbish truck while he was trying to 
retrieve his confiscated fish. After that, people in the northern Rif region took immediately to the streets to express their 
frustration and anger.
Middle East and North Africa Regional Architecture: 
Mapping Geopolitical Shifts, Regional Order and Domestic Transformations
21
WORKING PAPERS
No. 14, October 2018
Turning to the second trend concerning the impact of collective identities at the political and 
institutional levels, it is possible to observe the hardening and polarization of political stances. 
Again, the Turkish and the Israeli cases tell two similar stories with some differences. In the 
case of Turkey, the position that has been increasingly hardened is the nationalist one, which has 
become the umbrella under which a number of societal groups have united. This trend correlates 
with regional and international developments in addition to domestic ones. Among these factors, 
the migration crisis linked to the Syrian civil war has brought another dimension into the identity 
debate. “Like other collective identities, ‘being a Syrian’ is increasingly discussed as a notion of 
identity, especially in the cities with the biggest number of refugees”, argued one interviewee 
(Interview 10). According to the same interviewee, this situation is a source of concern among the 
local communities, which highlights the importance of a properly functioning social integration 
plan run by local governments and provincial authorities. As already discussed, the 2016 failed 
coup attempt has created favourable terrain for a renewed nationalist rhetoric within political 
circles as well as the public opinion. Politically, “the direction of Turkey’s ruling political party 
[AKP], which principally addresses conservative sensitivities, is now more on the nationalist side, 
getting closer to the stance of the Nationalist Movement Party [MHP]”, argued one interviewee 
(Interview 2) – as also exemplified by the result of the parliamentary and presidential elections 
held in Turkey on 24 June 2018 that reflected the united conservative and nationalist tendencies 
in the society. Socially, a majority of the population believes that the nation is under threat, and 
that during this time of serious danger to Turkey’s integrity following the July 2016 failed coup 
attempt, discussions regarding the status and place of collective identities should not be on the 
agenda (Gündoğar and Görgülü 2017). Symbolically, 15 July was declared by legislative proposal 
as a national holiday, the “Day of Democracy and National Unity”, in 2017. The commemoration 
events of the first anniversary of the failed coup attempt put specific emphasis on the rhetoric of 
national solidarity.
As argued by the interviewees, the political climate in the post-coup attempt period has contributed 
to constraining the progress of social initiatives and of civil engagement and mobilization with 
regard to almost all collective identities, which hinders the interaction between them and 
therefore pushes them to retreat into their own shells. Countering this trend, some elements of 
hybridization of collective identities can be detected, producing spaces and sub-identities that 
tend to be mobilized by social movements around diverse subjects such as gender equality and 
women’s rights or environmental protection. “These social movements function at the civil society 
level and might seem far from political issues. Yet they also have a rights-based nature and take 
a political attitude while addressing social issues”, argued one interviewee (Interview 5). At the 
same time, these social movements provide the terrain for interaction and collaboration between 
different collective identities around specific issues. “There is a visible engagement between 
secular and conservative feminists and secular and conservative environmentalists as they try to 
resolve the same social problems. Here, hybridization of collective identities is a ‘multiplying factor’ 
and as such it is valuable for democratization efforts” (Interview 5). Similarly, dynamics among 
the youth from different identity groups in Turkey show that growing social interconnectedness 
spurred by globalization is pushing them to come together. Yet the youth are still told to prioritize 
conformity rather than conflict within their immediate community, although they share significant 
discrepancies (Interview 5). As a result of this conformity, at the organizational level, although 
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youth activism within politically oriented groups tends to increase, its ability to produce change 
at the social and political levels has been constrained. Once again, the political climate as well as 
regional developments outside the borders of Turkey are believed to have a depoliticizing effect on 
the youth regardless of their collective identity.
Turning to the Israeli case, the hardening and strengthening of previously existing positions 
mostly concerns the neo-revisionist narrative. As right-wing governments have dominated Israeli 
politics for over fifteen years, ethno-religious and ultra-nationalist collective identities and 
political forces have grown stronger. In particular, the settler movement and its supporters have 
witnessed a significant political empowerment, as evidenced by the growing political strength of 
the pro-settler party Ha-Bayit ha-Yehudi (“The Jewish Home”) and its participation in consecutive 
Israeli government coalitions. Claiming that it is “God who gave us this land”, one interviewed 
settler stressed that “our voice is now taken into consideration by the government” (Interview 27). 
Significantly, the political Right has largely succeeded in marginalizing the Palestinian issue. To 
put it in the words of this settler, “we continue to work our land and take what is ours” (Interview 
27). Conversely, the political Left feels increasingly embattled. As another interviewee put it, “we 
live in a country where it is easier to declare openly one is gay than to declare publicly one is a 
leftist” (Interview 23). Perhaps even more importantly, facing multiple attempts by the government 
“to silence us in different ways […] we keep working outside of the official political space”, as one 
interviewed activist reported (Interview 28). Indeed, notwithstanding the government’s attempts to 
target left-wing CSOs with restrictive legislation, an impressive number of progressive-liberal civil 
society organizations are still active in Israel, seeking to defend human rights as well as the two-
state solution with the Palestinians, which they consider intrinsically linked to the future of Israeli 
democracy (Interview 28). They are also very active in defending the rights of African immigrants 
and asylum seekers who face imprisonment or deportation (Interview 29). However, their work 
has become increasingly difficult. “Organizations such as B’Tselem and Breaking the Silence were 
respected […] but now are seen as traitors of the nation”, complained one interviewee associated 
with a left-wing political party (Interview 28). However, many people no longer feel represented at 
the political level and doubt whether their activities are having or will have a political impact in the 
current political climate.
In addition to the growth of the neo-revisionist forces and the decline of the Left, another interesting 
development is the increasing activism of Arab-Palestinian political forces. Incidentally prompted 
by a change in the electoral law that raised the threshold to enter parliament to 3.25 per cent – 
a measure that was meant to target the small Arab political parties – two Arab parties and one 
Jewish–Arab party merged into one single party, the Arab Joint list. This party is currently the 
third-largest party in the Israeli Knesset. While seeking to join forces in spite of the political, socio-
economic and religious differences within the Arab community, the objective of political activists 
associated with the Joint List is to increase the political participation of the Arab citizens of Israel 
so as to achieve the equality of all Israeli citizens (Interview 32). In other words, the objective is “to 
develop a common sense of responsible citizenship” (Interview 33). While parliamentary politics 
is the main objective of these political activists, they also cooperate with different Israeli civil 
society organizations that promote equality, Jewish and Palestinian alike. These goals and their 
modus operandi seem to represent a departure from the Arab communities’ approach to Israeli 
politics of previous decades, when participation in Israeli politics was considered a betrayal of 
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the cause (Interview 32). Similarly, while ending Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories 
still enjoys a high priority, the focus of attention seems to have shifted to the civil rights and 
living conditions of the Palestinian communities within Israel. Interestingly, the “explosion” of the 
collective political identity of the Palestinian citizens of Israel was identified as the most important 
political development in recent years by a Palestinian-Israeli political activist (Interview 32). It is 
interesting to note that a similar development seems to be taking place among the Palestinian 
residents of Arab Jerusalem, who are entitled to participate in local elections but usually have 
refrained from doing so; for the first time, a joint Jewish–Arab list is running for the local elections 
in Jerusalem in October 2018.
Finally, the Tunisian case tells a very different story compared with the Turkish and Israeli cases 
since it represents the only success story of democratization among the countries that underwent 
the Arab uprisings. In the context of this democratization process, state–society relations 
in Tunisia after 2011 have been characterized by the search for inclusion, moderation and 
participation through dialogue and compromise. One interesting aspect of the Tunisian case is that 
the pluralization/hybridization of collective identities has gone hand in hand with a pluralization/
hybridization at the level of civil society and political society. Although numbers in themselves 
do not say much about the dynamism of Tunisian society and politics, it has been observed that 
a large number of civil society organizations, associations and political parties have emerged, 
trying to find their own niche and thus exploiting identity issues for self-identification and the 
advancement of claims (Interview 13). It is largely thanks to some of the (new) identity-based 
demands that progress has been made in making the Tunisian state more democratic, accountable 
and responsive vis-à-vis society (Colombo 2018). For example, it is thanks to the mobilization of 
more than 100 women’s associations – in spite of all the rifts and the divisions among them – that 
a new law introducing the concepts of violence against women, of moral and sexual violence, and 
of economic exploitation was adopted in July 2017 after being held up in the legislative process 
for more than twenty years (Interviews 12, 17; Colombo and Meddeb 2018). Similarly, it is thanks 
to the “bubbling up” of previously repressed or silent regional and local collective identities that 
the issue of the inequalities between the core and the periphery has entered the public debate, to 
the point that the “Code des collectivités locales”, namely the organic law regulating regional and 
local governance, was adopted by the ARP only ten days before the Tunisian municipal elections 
held on 6 May 2018.12 The Code introduces several important provisions implementing the 
decentralization plan, addressing the economic marginalization of certain areas and ultimately 
fostering local democracy.
A final note on Tunisian civil society is in order here. When speaking of inclusion, moderation 
and participation, these terms mainly refer to the ability of Tunisian civil society to act as “a 
complementary actor to the state institutions” (Interview 12). Many interviewees also argued that 
civil society in Tunisia became a pole of convergence of different collective identities through a 
culture of dialogue and compromise during the so-called “golden age” of civil society activism 
between 2011 and 2014 (Interviews 12, 13, 16). In other words, although collective identities in 
Tunisia are plural in number as well as in substance, the existence of a common Tunisian identity 
has not been jeopardized by the pluralization/hybridization process. On the contrary, “Tunisian 
identity – dating back to only 60 years – has been further reinforced after the events of 2011 and over 
12 The previous local elections in Tunisia had been held in 2010.
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the course of the democratic transition”, argued one interviewee (Interview 20). This is the result 
of the mobilization and hard work of civil society that has pushed for reforms and obtained them – 
although democratic consolidation still has to be achieved and some of the changes appear more 
cosmetic than substantive because of significant problems with implementation (Interviews 16, 
21). The limits of this process involving Tunisian civil society have started to manifest themselves 
since late 2014, in particular after the parliamentary elections of October 2014. Being in the 
spotlight is not always beneficial for civil society. Some sectors of Tunisian civil society have been 
exposed to excessive professionalization and specialization with a view to attracting scarce funding. 
“This is an externally driven process and some of the CSOs have lost the connection to the people 
and claims they purport to represent”, acknowledged one civil society activist (Interview 14). In 
addition, another shortcoming that concerns the Tunisian civil society landscape is the stark gap 
that exists between the means, outreach, activism and sometimes aggressive competition of the 
Tunis-based CSOs – often derogatorily called “Tunisoises” – and the plethora of associations that 
are active at the local level but have limited budgets and visibility (Interview 15). This fragmented 
landscape at the level of civil society has acted as a powerful constraining factor on the overall 
democratization process the country has experienced since 2011. Moreover, the political society 
has “failed to uphold its commitments and has fallen back on old, ‘divide et impera’ strategies to 
implement largely superficial reforms” (Interview 16).
CONCLUSIONS
This report has explored the nature, scope and impact of different trends concerning collective 
identities in the MENA region by drawing on the comparative empirical assessment of four case 
studies: Israel, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. The analysis of these case studies points to two 
opposing trends: pluralization/hybridization vs entrenchment/polarization of collective identities. 
Nevertheless, this dichotomy does not capture the full complexity and the nuances of every case. 
What should be clear by now is that the different trends experienced by these countries reinforce the 
argument that societies in the MENA region have undergone significant changes in the last decade 
and in particular in the years since 2011. The Moroccan and the Tunisian cases offer interesting 
evidence concerning the pluralization/hybridization of collective identities and their impact at the 
institutional and political levels. They also point to the existence of significant differences within 
this trend: in the former case the temporary convergence and rapprochement of already existing 
collective identities under the umbrella of the 20th February Movement, while in the latter case 
the “explosion” (i.e., fragmentation) and the “bubbling up” of old collective identities with new 
forms, meanings and claims. The pairing of the Israeli and Turkish cases offers another viewpoint 
from which to gauge the role of collective identities in domestic order-making in the MENA. In 
both cases the trend of entrenchment/polarization of existing collective identities – be they in the 
form of the nationalist rhetoric in Turkey or of the neo-revisionist tendency in Israel – represents 
a significant change compared with the previous contemporary history of partial societal diversity 
and pluralism. One point in common among the four case studies is that issue-based activism 
at the level of civil society, such as around gender equality and women’s rights or environmental 
issues, has been significant across all cases. This has provided the terrain for interaction and 
cooperation among different collective identities.
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To make sense of the pluralization/hybridization vs entrenchment/polarization dichotomy as 
well as to enrich its explanatory potential, three factors should be mentioned. The first is the 
temporal one. The 2011 revolts and the ensuing transition processes represented an important 
turning point for both Morocco and Tunisia, although a number of continuities exist with previous 
trends at the societal level. It is indeed not possible to fully appraise the “revolutionary” nature 
of 2011 for the civil society and the political society of Tunisia without taking into account the 
preparatory phase that took place, for example, during the years of Ben Ali with regard to the 
growing perception of marginalization felt by the inhabitants of specific peripheral regions and 
territories that subsequently became the basis for the “bubbling up” of specific collective identities 
and claims at the local level. On the contrary, in Israel and Turkey the entrenchment/polarization 
of existing collective identities straddled a much longer time frame that includes the past fifteen to 
twenty years, which makes this dynamic more robust than in the Moroccan and the Tunisian cases. 
It is true, however, that it has been in the past five to seven years that this dynamic has acquired 
political and institutional salience (particularly in the Turkish case) and led to the entrenchment 
of nationalist sentiments and of the predominant neo-revisionist narrative. The second factor has 
to do with the context-driven nature of changes in collective identities. In this respect not only is 
the context represented by the domestic and local dynamics and actors of each individual country, 
but regional and international ones need to be factored in as well. In the cases of Israel and Turkey 
– and in the Middle East in general – the impact of collective identities and cleavages on societal, 
institutional and political patterns cannot be isolated from the porousness of these countries vis-
à-vis the external context. The Syrian conflict and its regional ramifications are a case in point 
as far as Turkey and partially Israel are concerned (in the latter case, the second Palestinian 
Intifada and Iran’s quest for regional hegemony following the demise of arch rival Saddam Hussein 
during the US invasion of Iraq are probably more important). By contrast, in Morocco and Tunisia 
– also taking the differences between the two into account – the trend towards the pluralization/
hybridization of collective identities has rather been strongly influenced by the legacy of existing 
political and institutional structures particularly in times of transition (Colombo 2018). Finally, 
the third factor that allows for making sense of the pluralization/hybridization vs entrenchment/
polarization of collective identities dichotomy is the issue of leadership. In all four countries state 
authorities have continued to exploit and manipulate the collective identities and the cleavages 
among them to achieve their goals, thus fostering pluralization or entrenchment dynamics. Once 
again the set of factors incentivizing or constraining elite behaviours is varied and they range from 
purely domestic issues, including political calculus, institutional inertia and electoral dynamics, 
to externally-driven ones. Among the latter the role of the EU vis-à-vis the four cases taken 
individually, its transformative potential in external relations and its ability to work as an “anchor” 
for its partners can be mentioned.
To conclude, studying changing patterns of state–society relations in the MENA region through the 
lens of the role of collective identities proves a useful exercise both theoretically and empirically. 
On the one hand, it allows us to counterbalance prominent but necessarily partial state-centric 
analyses of domestic politics in the MENA (e.g., Kamrava 2016). On the other hand, it makes it 
possible to explore the link between identity politics at the individual level and macro political and 
institutional developments. This link represents the core of the analysis of state–society relations. 
In the light of the empirical evidence presented above, it can be argued that a greater degree of 
complexity has been injected into state–society relations in the MENA countries in recent years. 
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However, being the result of different trends concerning collective identities and responses at the 
political and institutional levels – among other things – this greater complexity has not necessarily 
translated into more conflictual state–society relations and the predominance of centrifugal 
instead of centripetal dynamics at the domestic level. The final result depends on the combined 
direction of the two variables assessed in this report, namely opposing trends in relation to 
collective identities and the behaviour of state authorities vis-à-vis those identities. Similar, self-
reinforcing trends in the two variables in the cases of Israel and Turkey – going in the direction 
of entrenchment/polarization – mean that state–society relations are not conflictual between the 
hegemonic collective identities and the state at this time of writing and probably will not be in 
the years to come. However, the entrenchment/polarization trend leads to greater conflict within 
society between the hegemonic and the non-hegemonic collective identities and to the disjuncture 
between an important part of it (i.e., the collective identities that are marginalized and treated as 
minorities – for example, the Left , the Arab citizens, and the African refugees in the case of Israel 
and the Kurdish population in the case of Turkey) and the state. This conflict potential dangerously 
applies to the relations vis-à-vis the outside world as well because the collective identities that 
have become hegemonic in Turkey and Israel tend to espouse nationalist and ultra-nationalist 
preferences. The other two cases of Morocco and Tunisia instead present mixed features whereby 
the initial opening up of civil society after 2011, the activism and the emergence of pluralized/
hybrid collective identities (away from the dichotomy between hegemonic and non-hegemonic 
collective identities) and claims have not been entirely matched by processes of inclusion at 
the political and institutional levels. This is particularly the case in Morocco where business as 
usual has tended to prevail and only largely symbolic policies have been enacted to respond to 
the people’s demands. In this light, conflictual state–society relations cannot be underestimated 
currently and in the years to come in the country. On the contrary, Tunisia has been partially able 
to develop more virtuous strategies to make state and society complementary players that operate 
through dialogue and compromise.
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